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Abstract
Since COVID-19 was first discovered, it exploded into a pandemic resulting in devastating effects on human lives
and a global recession. While there have been discussions that COVID-19 will accelerate the ‘end of globalization
and multilateralism’, we have already seen the high costs of non-cooperation in responding to the virus resulting in
sub-optimal use of resources, rapid spread of the virus between countries, and, ultimately, significant loss of life. In
spite of their favorable demographic structures and relatively young populations, countries in the Global South are
still harshly affected in both epidemiological and economic terms. Nations must find innovative ways to address
health concerns and regional bodies are possible mechanisms for facilitating international cooperation on health.
We delineate how regional organizations can support how countries address health threats namely by serving as a
bridge between the global and national policy levels; strengthening disease surveillance; mobilizing supply chains
and facilitating trade; supporting the production and procurement of medicines and supplies; and coordinating
policies and work with other actors. We finalize by arguing that mechanisms for regional cooperation must be
strengthened themselves in order to effectively contribute to positive health outcomes within member states.
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Background
While there have been discussions that as a result of
COVID-19 countries will turn more inwardly, collabor-
ate less with global institutions, and become more na-
tionalistic, this is not a realistic option for many low-
and middle- income countries. It is not a choice for
many small and medium-sized countries either. Unfortu-
nately, we have seen evidence of this thinking with the
reemergence of ‘vaccine nationalism’. This is a
phenomenon that was first evident during the H1N1
epidemic and recently we have observed it in practice
when high-income countries have brokered deals with
major pharmaceutical companies to preorder their still-
in-development COVID-19 vaccines. Through these ac-
tions, countries prioritize their citizens’ self-interest in
lieu of cooperating with other nations to find solutions.
In the case of the USA this has also resulted in the
country’s refusal to join the COVAX facility that aims to
ensure more equitable distribution of vaccines between
countries regardless of their ability to pay. Indeed, evi-
dence shows that over 80% of the supply of one of the
most promising vaccines with an efficacy rate of over
90% developed by Pfizer, has already been claimed by
the United States (US), United Kingdom (UK), European
Union (EU), Canada and Japan [1]. Even if the vaccine
were to be made available at a feasible rate to some low-
and middle- income countries, they would also need to
grapple with the high costs of maintaining, storing and
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transporting the vaccine, as well as deploying it among
their citizens.
Amidst high numbers of cases in Latin America,
Southeast Asia, India, and South Africa and evidence
that COVID-19 has impacted countries in the Global
South harshly in epidemiological and economic terms
[2] and will continue to do so if there are resurgent
waves of the disease, these countries must find innova-
tive ways to address their national health concerns and
regional cooperation is one of the mechanisms to do so.
Regional cooperation between neighboring countries
refers to a wide variety of forms of collaboration, ranging
from informal cooperation, setting up joint projects (e.g.
to build common infrastructure), coordinating policies
and regulatory frameworks, to shaping joint policies and
institutions. If the latter is the case, we refer to regional
organizations. Regional organizations can be supra-
national organizations (like in the case of the EU) or
inter-governmental organizations, where countries do
not surrender power to the wider organization, which is
the most common form of cooperation (e.g. in the Asso-
ciation of Southeast Asian Nations -ASEAN-; Southern
Common Market – Mercosur-, or the Southern African
Development Community – SADC-). These organiza-
tions emerged from recognizing that neighboring coun-
tries share common characteristics, in many cases
sharing similar histories and cultures; geographic fea-
tures; and – especially - shared problems. These shared
problems may comprise of governance challenges and/or
geo-political and economic interests. However, as we
will see later on, a particular regional institutional design
or cooperation modality does not fully define the func-
tions of an organization.
While the past decades have been characterized by
an increased participation of regional organizations in
the Global South on social issues, their effectiveness
has been constrained by not only existing inequities
in power and influence within its member states; but
also inequities at the international level. As a result
of this, other high-income nations or blocs (e.g. the
EU) have been able to shape global health policy in
more effective ways. In addition, regional organiza-
tions do not exist in a void and must contend with
their commitments to other alliances (given that
countries frequently belong to different groupings or
blocs); prevailing tensions within countries between
protecting national interests versus building shared
goals for social issues, such as health; as well as the
local politics of its members. Indeed, in the case of
the now defunct Union of South American Nations
(UNASUR), its country support disintegrated as soon
as there were political shifts in the region. Paradoxic-
ally before UNASUR experienced its decline, it was
known for its relatively effective regional cooperation
in health policy. Furthermore, similar to other inter-
national institutions, inter-governmental regional or-
ganizations serve the member states and not vice
versa, meaning these institutions have little to no
power to hold member states accountable to their
commitments and most policymaking occurs through
consensus, severely hampering explicit actions on
health.
Importantly, it would be simplistic to suggest that we
can identify clear links between the level of
institutionalization of a regional organization and the
importance or effectiveness of regional health policies.
For instance in the case of the EU, which is a heavily in-
stitutionalized regional organization, primary responsi-
bilities regarding health policies still lie with the member
states. This may in part explain the perceived lack of a
united EU response to the COVID-19 crisis. In addition,
complementary European health policies have only grad-
ually been introduced by integrating them in the context
of the regulation of the internal market. In the case of
the UNASUR, it has been argued that the relative suc-
cess of their involvement in health was not so much the
result of creating heavy institutions or producing re-
gional health rules, but rather stemmed from creating
light sector-specific mechanisms capable of reducing
transaction costs, promoting information sharing and
serving as catalysts for the diffusion of best practices and
cross-country cooperation [3].
Ultimately, the question is whether regional organiza-
tions, or regional arrangements more generally, can be
effective when faced with cross-border policy challenges
such as COVID-19.
How can regional organizations support their
member states during health emergencies?
We know that regional cooperation works in health
emergencies. An outbreak of another novel virus in
2002, Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS), not
only led to revised International Health Regulations,
but it also showed how regional cooperation in health
can work in modern times to address emergency situ-
ations. Following an understanding that countries
could not control SARS on their own, ASEAN con-
vened a meeting at the time to develop practical ad-
vice to support countries’ responses as well as strict
measures to contain the spread throughout the con-
tinent [4]. ASEAN’s response was lauded by the
World Health Organization (WHO) as an example of
effective international cooperation against a common
enemy, contributing to the minimal spread of the dis-
ease around the world [5].
Despite the lack of research on the topic, what is clear
is that in practice the current COVID-19 situation dem-
onstrates the cost of non-cooperation. We have seen
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uncoordinated quarantine measures; lockdown measures
and border closures (leading to congestions in certain
border cities); unorganized repatriation of foreign na-
tionals from several countries; uncoordinated measures
to control and facilitate the trade of medical supplies;
among other issues. The lack of coordination in all these
cases has led to either unnecessarily spreading the virus
to neighboring countries and/or a sub-optimal use of
medical supplies and infrastructure.
We argue that regional cooperation, in general, and re-
gional organizations, in particular, can support countries
in the current crisis as well as help minimize the risks
related to subsequent waves of COVID-19. This is even
more critical in the case of countries in the Global South
which do not have the same resources, not only in terms
of hospital capacity, testing supplies, and the number
and distribution of health care workers; but also in terms
of economic sustainability compared with the Global
North.
Areas for regional cooperation to respond to the COVID-
19 crisis
As already discussed, it is not possible to put all regional
organizations in one box; we know they vary in compos-
ition, institutionalization and approach to health [6].
However, opportunities exist for collaboration either as
formalized institutions or ad hoc ones created to address
the pandemic. Below we describe some examples of
areas where regional groupings can act to address
COVID-19 or other health emergencies.
Serving as a bridge between the global and national level
In our research we have found how regional organiza-
tions can serve dual roles while acting as intermediaries
between the global and national levels. These bodies can
help their member states in a vertical manner, for in-
stance by translating agreements and guidelines from
the global level (e.g. the Sustainable Development Goals)
to national policies and targets appropriate to their spe-
cific settings and mobilizing resources to reach these
goals; as well as horizontally with the countries by pro-
viding data and support to address cross-border policy
challenges and supporting evidence-based coordination
of these goals [7]. At the same time, regional organiza-
tions can coordinate their responses with the WHO re-
gional offices (such as the Pan American Health
Organization [PAHO], South-East Asia Region [SEARO],
and Regional Office for Africa [AFRO]) following their
technical guidance, as well as supporting epidemiological
surveillance and case identification by encouraging data
sharing across countries. For example, as we will discuss
later, following a proposal by Costa Rica, PAHO worked
with its member states to share knowledge and access to
COVID-19 therapeutics and vaccines through the
COVID-19 Technology Access Pool (C-TAP) initiative.
Regional bodies have also historically collaborated with
WHO regional offices, following their technical guide-
lines and developing action plans based on their input.
However, the differences between both types of insti-
tutions are clear. Whereas WHO regional offices are
usually agencies based on continental groupings (at
least in the cases of PAHO and AFRO), regional or-
ganizations involved in health are guided by the
unique needs of their member states with specific
health concerns and are likely to take more normative
positions for health. WHO regional offices are unable
to do so given their composition and mandate. For
instance, UNASUR clearly took the charge to advance
the ideal of health as a human right in international
discussions and forums, which is something that
PAHO could not do as forcefully. This means re-
gional organizations can be more courageous in pro-
posing systemic change on how health issues are
addressed since they are not constrained by a
mandate as technical agencies that are apolitical and
as we know, as much as we try to avoid it, health
policies and decision-making are innately political.
Due to this, groupings of countries guided by regional
organizations, for example, can take stronger stances
to guide the work of WHO regional offices if they
have enough convening power to do so, thus tipping
the scales within an international organization. We
have seen increasing signs of this in the case of the
WHO, which has traditionally been constrained by the
budgetary support of high-income countries, with several
African countries recently calling for a redistribution in
how the WHO budget is allocated between the WHO
headquarters’ office and regional agencies.
Regional bodies can also advocate for their member
states by developing joint positions in international
forums such as the World Health Assembly to obtain
support for their policy goals and negotiate with other
nations or blocs on key issues that impact low- and
middle- income countries. Given the importance of a
vaccine to address COVID-19, the COVAX facility, a
mechanism to pool the procurement and distribution
of vaccines, has been a welcome partnership among
several countries. However, this initiative has been
criticized for issues such as lack of transparency on
the vaccine strategy, price and possible risks. More-
over, questions still remain on whether pharmaceut-
ical companies can be held liable under this
agreement over possible deaths or side effects [8]. Ul-
timately, initiatives such as these should avoid repro-
ducing past mistakes in inequitable decision-making
that have persisted over time in global policy, by giv-
ing a voice to low- and middle- income countries
participating in the scheme. Regional organizations
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have the potential to bring out these concerns and
negotiate on the basis of strength in numbers with
powerful pharmaceutical companies.
Facilitating cross-border mobilization of goods
The COVID-19 pandemic demonstrated how ill-
prepared countries were on many levels but perhaps
most visible was the lack of supplies in clinical settings,
in terms of ventilators but also swabs and testing kits,
among other supplies. This was compounded in many
cases by closures of borders between countries, which
left many citizens stranded in neighboring countries and
limited trade between areas. Apart from ‘constitutional-
izing’ intra-regional free trade by means of free trade
areas, customs unions or common markets, regional or-
ganizations can play an important role in supporting the
mobilization of supply chains and facilitating the trans-
portation of critical medical supplies by implementing
inter-state agreements. For example, early on in the pan-
demic, SADC adopted guidelines to facilitate the move-
ment of essential goods across borders while limiting the
spread of the disease [9]. Regional groupings should con-
sider similar actions in future health emergencies, as well
as working together to coordinate border closures and
quarantine measures if necessary.
Even if it might not be realistic or even desirable to re-
gionally centralize or pool strategic medical supplies, re-
gional management mechanisms might make a lot of
sense so that a temporary overcapacity in one member
state can be matched with lower capacity in another
member state. Likewise, even in conditions of lockdown,
mutual and regulated cross-border access to hospital
capacity in neighboring border cities might save lives.
This was illustrated by Germany, Austria and
Luxembourg accepting COVID-19 patients from Italy,
France and The Netherlands during the first wave of
COVID-19 [10].
Pooling resources for the production and procurement of
medicines and supplies
Based on past experience, countries like India and Brazil
have demonstrated ability to produce therapeutics or
vaccines for COVID-19; however, a large number of
countries in the Global South do not have the technol-
ogy, patents or facilities to produce medications and
supplies such as masks. India and South Africa submit-
ted a joint proposal for the Trade-Related Aspects of In-
tellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Council to recommend
the World Trade Organization grant a waiver from some
obligations under the TRIPS agreement to avoid barriers
to scaling up health technologies to respond to the
COVID-19 pandemic, highlighting the need for rapid ac-
cess to affordable medical products, personal protective
equipment as well as medicines and vaccines. Given its
significance, these proposals were supported by several
other WTO members from the Global South but opposed
by some high-income countries [11]. While this proposal
has been supported by several intergovernmental and
non-governmental organizations, including the African
Union (AU) [12]; regional organizations from the Global
South still haven’t fully exploited their convening power in
these forums nor do they have the same experience and
capacity to negotiate these agreements compared to the
EU and other high-income countries. While significant ef-
forts were made by institutions such as UNASUR and
SADC to strengthen the training of their diplomats in
health issues, this is an ongoing process that requires
more investment and attention.
At the same time, regional organizations can facilitate
the joint procurement of essential medicines, medical
supplies and other equipment through pooled purchas-
ing. This not only ensures a lower price through bulk
purchasing but also equalizes the negotiating power of
countries, especially lower-income countries, whom
otherwise would not be competitive. Mercosur started
experimenting with this in 2015 in collaboration with
the PAHO Strategic Fund in order to jointly procure
high-cost medicines, initially to treat hepatitis C and
HIV/AIDS, resulting in cost savings of around US$20
million [13].
Several regional efforts have already emerged to re-
spond to COVID-19. Following an initiative by Costa
Rica, PAHO proposed a technology platform named (C-
TAP) to facilitate the equitable sharing of knowledge,
data and intellectual property on COVID-19, as well as
access to effective vaccines, medicines and other health
products [14]. In addition, several regional grouping
such as Mercosur and the South Asian Association for
Regional Cooperation (SAARC) have also approved
emergency funds to support their member states during
the COVID-19 crisis [15].
Coordinating actions with donors and external partners
Low and middle countries already face capacity con-
straints to address their own domestic issues. While
external support is welcome, it frequently has unin-
tended consequences and costs related to communi-
cating and reporting to different donors with various
requirements (what is commonly referred to as trans-
action costs), leading to negative effects on already
limited country capacities. Regional organizations can
coordinate the work of donors and partners to sup-
port countries. For example, the (AU) coordinated the
donation of medical supplies from the Jack Ma Foun-
dation to its member states consisting of surgical sup-
plies, ventilators, protective clothing, etc. [16].
Countries can also begin to set the basis for their re-
covery by generating mechanisms to reduce the
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economic and social effects of the pandemic by jointly
negotiating debt forgiveness from multi-lateral banks
and partnering with donors for regional growth, for
example. They can also support countries mobilize re-
sources for other existing health initiatives or concur-
rent health emergencies, such as maternal and child
health programs or outbreaks of diseases such as
Ebola or Dengue fever, which may otherwise experi-
ence a shortfall in funding due to the focus on
COVID-19.
Conclusion
Regional organizations vary from relatively light inter-
governmental coordination mechanisms to comparably
heavy supranational institutions. Independent of their
particular institutional characteristics, they have the po-
tential to play a role in addressing health emergencies
especially with respect to coordinating mobility mea-
sures for citizens, protecting cross-border flows of med-
ical and food supplies, jointly procuring medicines and
strategically managing resources, among other actions.
It is clear that countries within each region have par-
ticular needs and resources, as well as different degrees
of vulnerability to epidemics and thus must deal with
their own complexities that require local and specific so-
lutions. While regional cooperation is not the silver bul-
let that will solve the problems caused by COVID-19, it
can be part of the solution particularly in the Global
South. For this to happen, mechanisms for cooperation
must be strengthened themselves. In some cases, this
will require managing the short-term self-interests of
countries and encouraging binding resolutions to avoid
inaction. It will also require political pragmatism and so-
lutions adapted to specific regional contexts. The
COVID-19 crisis has already shown us what the costs of
non-cooperation are, now it is time to leverage existing
structures to control the current pandemic and – even
more importantly - to better prepare for the next one.
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